Institutional design for deeply divided societies requires frameworks that stabilize political competition without demanding social consensus. Drawing on the model developed in Let’s Agree on Poland, this approach treats polarization as a structural and durable cleavage, not a temporary pathology. The central claim is that when ideological or identity groups are territorially clustered, and majority systems can intensify zero‑sum conflict.

The proposed solution is symmetric decentralization that lowers the stakes of national politics by reallocating authority to regions. Key mechanisms include:

• Robust regional self‑government over culturally sensitive policy areas;
• Territorial blocking mechanisms through a strengthened second chamber representing regional executives;
• Inter‑regional coordination bodies to maintain functional cohesion;
• National solidarity instruments to prevent territorial inequality.

This design aims to transform polarized democracies into conflict‑managing systems where rival value communities can coexist under shared constitutional rules. It contributes to academic debates by offering a middle path between consociationalism and federalism, emphasizing institutional pluralism within a unitary state.